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Consumer Perceptions of the Right to Repair
AARON PERZANOWSKI*
Device makers from Apple to John Deere have adopted designs and embraced
strategies that thwart the repair of the products they sell. In response, state
legislatures across the country are considering bills that would require firms to share
replacement parts, tools, software updates, and documentation with independent
repair shops and consumers. Beyond those legislative proposals, the battle over
repair extends to courts, administrative agencies, and even presidential campaigns.
As a matter of both policy and legal doctrine, that debate must be informed by
consumer attitudes and expectations. Do consumers prefer the convenience and
simplicity of replacing their devices when something goes wrong? Or do they expect
and value the ability to repair the things they own? If repair restrictions interfere
with such expectations and prevent consumers from engaging in lawful repairs, the
case for intervention is more persuasive. This Article presents the results of a
nationwide survey of consumers of electronic devices and explores its implications
for the burgeoning right to repair movement.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year, fifty million people in the United States break their smartphone
screens.1 Those who can afford it face a choice—either repair or replace their phones.
A new screen for an iPhone X costs as little as $30 from a third-party seller.2 But
replacing the screen requires tools, skills, and confidence many consumers lack. In
comparison, Apple currently charges $279 for this fairly straightforward repair, a fee

* Professor of Law, Oliver C. Schroeder Jr. Distinguished Research Scholar, Case
Western Reserve University. My thanks to Alissa Centivany, Leah Chan Grinvald, Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Jake Linford, Nathan Proctor, and Kyle Wiens for their comments.
1. Jared Gilmour, Americans Break Two Smartphone Screens Each Second, Costing $3.4
Billion a Year, Report Says, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 21, 2018, 5:51 PM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article222040170.html
[https://perma.cc/9MQK-6BCJ].
2. See, e.g., iPhone X Glass Screen Replacement Premium Repair Kit, PHONE REMEDIES,
https://phoneremedies.com/products/iphone-x-glass-screen-replacement-premium-repair-kitblack-or-white [https://perma.cc/CMV5-QYUQ] (listing price of $29.99).
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that often makes purchasing a new phone more attractive.3 And Apple further entices
customers by offering discounts on new phones if they trade in their existing device
instead of fixing it.4
Apple’s apparent preference for replacement over repair is economically rational.
At the time of its release, the iPhone X cost Apple about $350 to make, but it sold
for $999.5 That’s a profit margin of 64%.6 The company sold 218 million phones in
2018 alone, generating over $140 billion.7 In contrast, Apple claims that it makes no
profit at all on repair services.8 The company even blamed the popularity of its own
battery replacement program for declining iPhone sales.9
But the problem does not begin and end with iPhones. While Apple may be the
most visible repeat offender, car owners,10 farmers,11 photographers,12 and even

3. iPhone Screen Repair, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/iphone/repair/service/screen
-replacement [https://perma.cc/5G5U-WTEL] (listing prices between $279 and $329 to repair
an iPhone X, depending on the specific model). For experienced repair providers, screen
replacement is routine. But the task is manageable even for a novice. According to iFixit’s
step-by-step guide, it is a moderate repair that takes about an hour. See Jeff Suovanen, iPhone
X Screen Replacement, IFIXIT, https://www.ifixit.com/Guide/iPhone+X+Screen+Replacement
/102423 [https://perma.cc/XSM4-P548].
4. Apple Trade In, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/shop/trade-in [https://perma.cc
/H7WG-SVNC] (offering incentives up to $500 for trading in a used phone). Apple does not
disclose the percentage of trade-ins that are recycled as opposed to those that are refurbished
for resale.
5. Stephen Nellis, Apple's iPhone X has Higher Margin than iPhone 8: Analysis,
REUTERS, (Nov. 6, 2017, 4:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-iphone/applesiphone-x-has-higher-margin-than-iphone-8-analysis-idUSKBN1D62RZ [https://perma.cc
/5YSM-S3VA].
6. Id.
7. Tripp Mickle, Apple Reports Record Results but Weak Revenue Outlook, WALL
STREET J. (Nov. 1, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-reports-recordrevenue-and-profit-1541104284 [https://perma.cc/REE7-3VJC]; Apple's iPhone Revenue
from 3rd Quarter 2007 to 4th Quarter 2019, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics
/263402/apples-iphone-revenue-since-3rd-quarter-2007
[https://perma.cc/3UJJ-YWTW];
Global Apple iPhone Sales from 3rd Quarter 2007 to 4th Quarter 2018, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263401/global-apple-iphone-sales-since-3rd-quarter-2007
[https://perma.cc/L3JY-BR34].
8. Lauren Goode, Right-to-Repair Groups Don’t Buy Apple’s Answers to Congress,
WIRED (Nov. 27, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/right-to-repair-appleanswers-congress [https://perma.cc/7FNH-MBVG].
9. Jason Koebler, Tim Cook to Investors: People Bought Fewer New iPhones Because
They Repaired Their Old Ones, VICE (Jan. 2, 2019, 5:56 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us
/article/zmd9a5/tim-cook-to-investors-people-bought-fewer-new-iphones-because-theyrepaired-their-old-ones [https://perma.cc/4QAB-MB4C].
10. See Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Smart Cars, Telematics and Repair, U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2020).
11. Jason Koebler, Why American Farmers Are Hacking Their Tractors with Ukrainian
Firmware, VICE (Mar. 21, 2017, 4:17 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xykkkd/whyamerican-farmers-are-hacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-firmware [https://perma.cc
/X5K8-QUBZ].
12. Steve Dent, Nikon Ends its Authorized Third-Party Repair Program, ENGADGET,
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hospitals13 are forced to contend with repair restrictions. Device makers rely on an
assortment of economic, technological, and legal techniques to curtail repair. Repair
services are priced to encourage replacement. Marketing strategies emphasize
incremental feature improvement to drive short upgrade cycles. Product designs
incorporate components that are difficult to replace or require expensive tools. Some
devices, for all practical purposes, are impossible to repair.14 And as products
increasingly depend on local or cloud-based software code for their basic
functionality, device makers have even greater power to restrict repair. Firms also
rely on legal threats, ranging from voided warranties to copyright and patent claims,
to chill repair.
Taken together, these strategies allow firms to extract an increasing share of
consumer surplus. But even putting aside the impact on consumers’ pocketbooks, the
decision to replace rather than repair has far-reaching consequences. About 1.5
billion mobile phones are sold annually worldwide,15 contributing to the more than
fifty million tons of electronic waste produced every year.16 Electronics currently
account for 70% of the toxic waste in U.S. landfills, a figure that continues to rise.17
That e-waste includes lithium, mercury, and lead—chemicals that endanger our
water supplies and threaten human health.18
Even before the end of the product lifecycle, manufacturing and global shipping
produce significant pollution.19 And extracting the raw materials needed to produce

(Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019-12-10-nikon-ends-authorized-third-partyrepairs.html [https://perma.cc/BJ86-Y8CG].
13. Jason Koebler, Hospitals Need to Repair Ventilators. Manufacturers Are Making That
Impossible, VICE (Mar. 18, 2020, 2:15 PM), https://www.vice.com/amp/en_us/article
/wxekgx/hospitals-need-to-repair-ventilators-manufacturers-are-making-that-impossible
[https://perma.cc/C2PF-2WT9].
14. See AirPods Teardown, IFIXIT (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.ifixit.com/Teardown
/AirPods+Teardown/75578 [https://perma.cc/Q695-KNUM] (giving the AirPods a
repairability score of zero); AirPods Pro Teardown, IFIXIT (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://www.ifixit.com/Teardown/AirPods+Pro+Teardown/127551 [https://perma.cc/86HG
-BB6N] (giving the AirPods Pro a repairability score of zero).
15. How to Recycle Old Electronics, CONSUMER REPS. (Apr. 22, 2018),
https://www.consumerreports.org/recycling/how-to-recycle-electronics [https://perma.cc
/FC7S-LPB5] (noting sales of 1.5 billion in 2017); Andy Boxall, In 2018, Smartphone Sales
Stopped Growing Annually for the First Time, DIGIT. TRENDS (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www
.digitaltrends.com/mobile/2018-smartphone-sales-decline-news [https://perma.cc/532M
-RLJV] (noting 1.43 billion sales in 2018, down from 1.51 billion in 2017).
16. UN Report: Time to Seize Opportunity, Tackle Challenge of E-Waste, U.N. ENV’T
PROGRAMME (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/press-release
/un-report-time-seize-opportunity-tackle-challenge-e-waste [https://perma.cc/SZS9-ABMZ].
17. Peter Holgate, The Model for Recycling Our Old Smartphones is Actually Causing
Massive Pollution, VOX (Nov. 8, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2017/11/8
/16621512/where-does-my-smartphone-iphone-8-x-go-recycling-afterlife-toxic-wasteenvironment [https://perma.cc/FD4R-G8LJ].
18. Aleksandra Wisniewska, What Happens to Your Old Laptop? The Growing Problem
of E-waste, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/26e1aa74-2261-11ea-92da
-f0c92e957a96 [https://perma.cc/856X-PD9J].
19. Maddie Stone, Could Letting Consumers Fix their iPhones Help Save the Planet?,
GRIST, (Nov. 11, 2019), https://grist.org/article/could-letting-consumers-fix-their-own
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our devices inflicts both environmental and human costs. Cobalt, for example, is a
crucial component in the lithium-ion batteries found in phones, laptops, and electric
vehicles.20 Global demand for cobalt exceeds 100,000 tons per year.21 That number
is expected to increase threefold over the next decade.22 Most of the world’s cobalt
supply is found in the Democratic Republic of Congo.23 Roughly 20% of it is mined
by hand by a quarter million local creuseurs. They work in narrow, unstable tunnels,
inhaling toxic cobalt dust, for less than a dollar a day.24 And an estimated 35,000 of
them are children as young as six years old.25 By encouraging us to replace rather
than repair our devices, manufacturers are increasing the already high demand for
materials like cobalt. In the process, they are amplifying the negative environmental
and human rights externalities created by global electronics production.
The COVID–19 pandemic has dramatically highlighted the immediate
consequences of repair on human welfare. As hospitals across the globe faced
shortages of life-saving ventilators, and manufacturers scrambled to ramp up
production, the ability to maintain and repair existing equipment emerged as a
pressing problem. Authorized repair, which often requires shipping devices back to
the manufacturer, can leave hospitals without critical equipment for days or weeks.26
In other instances, manufacturers failed to supply replacement parts, imperiling
patients. When a hospital in Chiari, Italy, couldn’t secure valves for its respirators
from the manufacturer, local volunteers designed and 3D-printed 100 replacements
that cost no more than a few dollars apiece.27 The volunteers managed this feat in
just two days,28 with no help from the manufacturer, which refused to share design
specifications.29
Motivated by these social, economic, and environmental justice imperatives, a
collection of repair providers, policy advocates, tinkerers, and everyday consumers

-iphones-help-save-the-planet [https://perma.cc/HE9F-NKU7].
20. Siddharth Kara, Is Your Phone Tainted by the Misery of the 35,000 Children in
Congo's Mines?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global
-development/2018/oct/12/phone-misery-children-congo-cobalt-mines-drc [https://perma.cc
/CQ2N-Y9TA].
21. Sarah Katz-Lavigne, Demand for Congo’s Cobalt is on the Rise. So is the Scrutiny of
Mining Practices, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/2019/02/21/demand-congos-cobalt-is-rise-so-is-scrutiny-mining-practices
[https://perma.cc/H4DD-ZWWL].
22. See Cobalt: Demand-Supply Balances in the Transition to Electric Mobility, at 62–
63, EUR 29381 EN, Joint Research Center (2018).
23. Kara, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Koebler, supra note 13.
27. Amy Feldman, Meet the Italian Engineers 3D-Printing Respirator Parts for Free to
Help Keep Coronavirus Patients Alive, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2020, 3:57 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/amyfeldman/2020/03/19/talking-with-the-italian-engineerswho-3d-printed-respirator-parts-for-hospitals-with-coronavirus-patients-for-free
/#30be5fdf78f1 [https://perma.cc/TW8X-DVVC].
28. Id.
29. Jay Peters, Volunteers Produce 3D-Printed Valves for Life-Saving Coronavirus
Treatments, VERGE (Mar. 17, 2020, 6:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/17
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has coalesced. This right to repair movement has pressured state and federal
authorities to recognize the existing barriers to repair and to adopt legal
interpretations, regulations, and statutes that would empower consumers to repair the
things they own. Despite widespread public support, the efforts of the right to repair
movement have faced effective resistance through the lobbying efforts of device
makers like Apple and John Deere.30 But the fight over repair remains an active one.
In 2019, right to repair bills were introduced in twenty statehouses around the
country.31 And 2020 promises similar levels of activity.
Part I of this Article details the strategies upon which device makers rely to
frustrate repair. Part II considers legislative interventions intended to push back on
existing barriers to repair, with a particular focus on the set of bills introduced in state
legislatures across the United States. Part III describes the results of a survey of more
than 800 U.S. consumers, focusing on their expectations of and experiences with the
repair of electronic devices. The legal and policy implications of those results are
discussed in Part IV.
I. RESTRICTING REPAIR
Restrictions on repair take a number of forms. Some are decades old. Others,
enabled by changes in technology and law, are more recent innovations. Some are
deliberate efforts to thwart repair. Others reflect indifference to reparability or a
failure to prioritize it. In practice, it can be difficult to disentangle the motivations
underlying product design, pricing, and other decisions that negatively affect repair.
Design choices that affect repair can sometimes be justified in terms of aesthetics,
usability, performance, and consumer safety. But less benevolent motivations are
sometimes apparent.32 Regardless of intent, the techniques described below enable
firms to exert considerable power over consumers’ ability to repair their devices.
In large measure, the ease with which a device can be repaired is a function of its
physical design. A firm determined to limit repair has no shortage of options. Rather
than standard screws, they can opt for new variants, like Pentalobe screws.33

/21184308/coronavirus-italy-medical-3d-print-valves-treatments [https://perma.cc/96QM
-CCHP].
30. Jason Koebler, Apple Is Lobbying Against Your Right to Repair iPhones, New York
State Records Confirm, VICE (May 18, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article
/nz85y7/apple-is-lobbying-against-your-right-to-repair-iphones-new-york-state-records
-confirm [https://perma.cc/RB8W-J2JE]; Matthew Gault, Maryland Suddenly Looks Like It
Might Break John Deere's Repair Monopoly, VICE (Mar. 12 2020, 8:38 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/k7ekzw/maryland-suddenly-looks-like-it-might-breakjohn-deeres-repair-monopoly [https://perma.cc/4FYC-R4FN].
31. Nathan Proctor, Right to Repair Wraps Up a Big Year, U.S. PIRG (Dec. 26, 2019),
https://uspirg.org/blogs/blog/usp/right-repair-wraps-big-year [https://perma.cc/RZF5-JQQW].
32. See Koebler, supra note 9; Rajesh Kumar Singh, Deere Bets on Cost Cuts, Services
Push to Boost Profits, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usdeere-strategy/deere-bets-on-cost-cuts-services-push-to-boost-profits-idUSKBN1Z72TA
[https://perma.cc/Z4SF-MRX7] (noting that John Deere is “betting on its parts and
maintenance services business” to increase profits).
33. Kyle Wiens, Apple’s Diabolical Plan to Screw Your iPhone, IFIXIT (Jan. 20, 2011),
https://www.ifixit.com/News/14279/apples-diabolical-plan-to-screw-your-iphone
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Specialized screws—and more importantly, the associated screwdrivers—are
typically less common and more expensive. Even worse, device makers can simply
glue components together rather than use screws or other fasteners. Glue often makes
it difficult to replace a single component without removing or damaging others.34
Some components, like batteries, are naturally less durable and more prone to failure
than others.35 When firms design their products in ways that complicate the
procedure for replacing these predictable points of failure, they increase the cost of
repair.
As a matter of product design, Apple’s AirPod wireless headphones embody a
ruthless hostility to repair. They retail for $159 for the basic version and $249 for the
Pro model.36 Apple sold thirty-five million pairs in 2018,37 and nearly sixty million
in 2019.38 Despite their price tag, AirPods fail to live up to their advertised five-hour
playback time after as little as eighteen months.39 Owners report batteries that last
for only fifteen to thirty minutes on a full charge.40 Unlike flashlights and remote
controls, and even some laptops and smartphones, AirPod batteries cannot be easily
replaced. AirPods have no screws; they are held together by glue and solder.41
Accessing the battery requires a special vibrating knife to cut through the plastic
shell.42 The procedure is all the more harrowing since the battery, about the thickness
of a spaghetti noodle, is prone to combustion if punctured.43 But even assuming you
can dislodge it safely, your AirPods will be irretrievably damaged in the process.
Beyond physical design, the widespread adoption of digital technologies has
enabled a new set of more sophisticated restraints on repair. The functionality of
devices from toasters to cars is controlled by embedded software code. That code, in
turn, gives device makers even greater leverage over post-sale consumer behavior,
including repair. Apple’s Error 53 scandal is a useful illustration. In 2016, iPhone
owners whose devices had been serviced by independent repair shops were shocked
when their devices would not start up, and their contacts, photos, and other data were

[https://perma.cc/N2SJ-494G].
34. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Everyone’s AirPods Will Die. We’ve Got the Trick to
Replacing Them, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/technology/2019/10/08/everyones-airpods-will-die-weve-got-trick-replacing-them
[https://perma.cc/Z4XC-LKU7].
35. See id.
36. Shop AirPods, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/shop/select-airpods [https://perma.cc
/WF7Z-ZYW9].
37. Jeremy White, The Secrets Behind the Runaway Success of Apple’s AirPods, WIRED
(May 9, 2020), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/apple-airpods-success [https://perma.cc
/WHN4-MX5T].
38. Charlie Wood, Apple Sold Nearly 60 Million AirPods in 2019, Analysts Estimate, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2020, 7:45 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-sold-nearly-60
-million-airpods-in-2019-strategy-analytics-2020-1 [https://perma.cc/CY4S-JC2P].
39. Alana Semuels, Your AirPods Will Die Soon, ATL. (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/your-airpods-probably-have
-terrible-battery-life/585439 [https://perma.cc/LFH3-CY22]; Fowler, supra note 34.
40. See Fowler, supra note 34.
41. Semuels, supra note 39.
42. Fowler, supra note 34.
43. Id.
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inaccessible.44 Phones that were working normally for weeks or months were
suddenly “bricked” after the installation of an Apple software update.45 That new
code was designed to detect a replacement connector between the device’s home
button and its Touch ID sensor, a reliable indicator of third-party repair.46 And when
the connector was found, the software instructed the phone to stop working
altogether.47
Firms have relied on a variety of planned obsolescence strategies to shorten the
life of their products for nearly a century.48 Today, they can leverage software to
artificially degrade product performance and spur consumers to buy replacements.
Apple recently agreed to pay $500 million to settle a series of class action lawsuits
over its throttling of older iPhones.49 In 2017, Reddit users uncovered Apple’s
practice of intentionally slowing down the processors of iPhones with weak
batteries.50 Apple later admitted that code in its iOS software detected aging batteries
and reduced the device’s processor speed.51 According to Apple, this move was
intended to prevent unexpected shutdowns.52 But since this code was not disclosed
to consumers, the cause of their device’s slow performance remained a mystery.
Many bought new devices rather than simply replace their phone’s battery.53 Apple’s
throttling and the secrecy surrounding it steered consumers away from repair and
toward replacement, inflating Apple’s bottom line in the process.
The proliferation of so-called “smart” products also undermines repair by
removing functionality from local devices and outsourcing it to remote servers.54 Jibo
was a foot-tall plastic robot with an emotive face and sensors that responded to

44. Matthew Panzarino, Apple Apologizes and Updates iOS to Restore iPhones Disabled
by Error 53, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 18, 2016, 1:01 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/02/18
/apple-apologizes-and-updates-ios-to-restore-iphones-disabled-by-error-53 [https://perma.cc
/SKP2-N7Z9]; Miles Brignall, ‘Error 53’ Fury Mounts as Apple Software Update Threatens
to Kill Your iPhone 6, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2016, 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/money/2016/feb/05/error-53-apple-iphone-software-update-handset-worthless-third-partyrepair [https://perma.cc/82F6-EQRB].
45. Brignall, supra note 44.
46. Panzarino, supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. See generally VANCE PACKARD, THE WASTE MAKERS (1960) (detailing the emergence
of planned obsolescence in the early twentieth century).
49. Adi Robertson, Apple Agrees to $500 Million Settlement for Throttling Older iPhones,
VERGE (Mar. 2, 2020, 12:01 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/2/21161271/apple
-settlement-500-million-throttling-batterygate-class-action-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/CKJ3
-J9EU].
50. Tom Warren & Nick Statt, Apple Confirms iPhones with Older Batteries Will Take
Hits in Performance, VERGE (Dec. 20, 2017, 2:47 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/12/20
/16800058/apple-iphone-slow-fix-battery-life-capacity [https://perma.cc/ZE73-X6PY].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Robertson, supra note 49.
54. This shift also amplifies concerns around privacy and security, among other things.
See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 87
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783 (2019).
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physical interaction that sold for $900.55 It could dance, talk, and play games with its
owners. When the company that built Jibo failed, it powered down its servers.56 Since
most of Jibo’s functionality depended on those distant servers rather than the device’s
on board computer, Jibo suffered from “digital dementia.” The robot went limp, its
dimly lit screen blank. And its head and torso “twist[ed] freely, like a lifeless body.”57
Although Jibo’s physical components could be repaired, most of its features were
housed on a remote server that Jibo owners could not access, let alone repair.58
In addition to product design, device makers leverage economic tools to dissuade
repair. When consumers are deciding whether to repair a device or replace it, they
are understandably sensitive to the cost differential between those two options.59 The
smaller the difference, the more likely they are to opt for a new device. One way to
narrow that gap is by charging high prices for repair. Samsung, for example, charges
as much as $279 to replace the screen on its Galaxy phones and up to $599 for
foldable screens.60 Likewise, firms like John Deere see repair services as a growth
sector, one from which they can extract significant profits.61
Trade-in programs are another economic tool device makers deploy to discourage
repair. Those incentives reduce the cost advantage of repair even further by offering
consumers discounts on new devices in exchange for discarding their old ones. As
Apple encourages its customers, “Turn the device you have into the one you want.”62
Not only do these programs entice consumers to buy new devices at incredibly high
markups, but they also help firms control secondary markets for used devices. In
some instances, trade-ins are refurbished and resold by the manufacturer. In other
cases, trade-ins are recycled—that is, harvested for raw materials used to produce
new, more expensive devices.63 But in either case, trade-in programs help firms like

55. Jeffrey Van Camp, My Jibo Is Dying and It’s Breaking My Heart, WIRED (Mar. 8,
2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/jibo-is-dying-eulogy [https://perma.cc/S46J
-XSRU].
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Cf. Sangman Han, Sunil Gupta & Donald R. Lehmann, Consumer Price Sensitivity
and Price Thresholds, 77 J. RETAILING 435, 435–6 (2001) (“Price has a significant influence
on consumers’ purchase behavior and consequently on firm sales and profits.”).
60. Samsung-Authorized Galaxy Repair Services, SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com
/us/support/repair/pricing/ [https://perma.cc/F652-H2UY].
61. Singh, supra note 32.
62. Apple Trade In, supra note 4.
63. Electronics recycling is itself problematic. In many instances, devices are shredded
and the metal components are shipped to polluting smelters. Other times, devices are shipped
to scrapyards in developing economies. Holgate, supra note 17. To their credit, companies
like Apple have invested in improving this process. But they still recycle only a tiny fraction
of the devices distributed into the global ecosystem. Apple’s Daisy robot, for example, can
recycle only 1.2 million iPhones per year. Dani Deahl, Daisy Is Apple’s New iPhone-Recycling
Robot, VERGE (Apr. 19, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/19/17258180
/apple-daisy-iphone-recycling-robot [https://perma.cc/RYG2-4DVX]; Press Release, Apple,
Apple Expands Global Recycling Programs (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.apple.com
/newsroom/2019/04/apple-expands-global-recycling-programs [https://perma.cc/VYR9
-PH3F].
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Apple prevent goods from entering the broader used marketplace where they can
drive down the demand for—and price of—new devices. Of course, firms can also
simply refuse to repair products at all. Apple, for example, distinguishes between
“vintage” products—those that haven’t been manufactured in the last five years—
and “obsolete” products—those that haven’t been manufactured in the last seven
years.64 For vintage products, Apple makes no guarantees that repair is available,
unless mandated by law.65 For obsolete products, “Apple has discontinued all
hardware service . . . with no exceptions.”66 Nor will Apple sell parts to service
providers for such products.67
But alone, a device maker’s internal policies and pricing for repair are ineffective
so long as a competitive market for third-party repair thrives. If Samsung charges
$279 to repair a cracked screen, but a reliable independent repair shop will do the job
for $100, consumers conscious of price or environmental impact will simply
patronize a locally owned repair shop. And for consumers confident in their own
mechanical skills, or simply willing to learn, they can attempt self-repair for the cost
of tools and parts. In order to stamp out the market for repairs—or capture its value—
firms must either eliminate third-party and self-repair altogether or increase their
costs to the point of unviability.
Device makers adopt a variety of strategies to make life difficult for independent
repair shops and consumers. Aside from design choices that frustrate repair, device
makers have attempted to limit the availability of materials and information crucial
to the practice of repair. As discussed in more detail below, firms make it difficult to
acquire replacement parts. The simplest measure is to refuse to sell parts to thirdparty repair providers, as camera-maker Nikon does.68 Firms also tightly control
access to diagnostic tools necessary to identify malfunctions.69 And they lock down
schematics and manuals that would facilitate repair. Dräger, a medical device
manufacturer, prevented the distribution of repair manuals for ventilators, a decision
that led to criticism during the COVID-19 pandemic.70 Even repair shops that are
“authorized” by manufacturers are not immune. Nikon decided in late 2019 to end

64. Vintage and Obsolete Products, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201624
[https://perma.cc/P84A-VLWY].
65. Id. This distinction is likely a response to California’s Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, which requires that “[e]very manufacturer making an express warranty with
respect to an electronic or appliance product . . . with a wholesale price to the retailer of one
hundred dollars ($100) or more, shall make available to service and repair facilities sufficient
service literature and functional parts to effect the repair of a product for at least seven years
after the date a product model or type was manufactured.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.03(b).
66. Vintage and Obsolete Products, supra note 64.
67. Id.
68. Elizabeth Chamberlain, How Nikon Is Killing Camera Repair, IFIXIT (Feb. 14, 2012),
https://www.ifixit.com/News/1349/how-nikon-is-killing-camera-repair [https://perma.cc
/BNW4-2QY4].
69. Koebler, supra note 11.
70. Koebler, supra note 13.
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its support for fifteen authorized repair shops, leaving its customers with just two
locations in the United States to have their cameras repaired.71
Software gives device makers another mechanism for increasing the costs of
independent repair. For example, the software embedded in John Deere tractors—
which cost farmers as much as $800,000 each72—requires authentication of new
parts before the vehicle will recognize them.73 So, a farmer who buys something as
simple as a turn signal and installs it herself or pays an independent repair shop to
install it is still forced to pay the local John Deere dealer to send a technician to
authenticate the part before it will work, for a fee of $230, plus $130 an hour for the
technician.74
Undergirding many of these strategies are legal regimes that offer device makers
considerable power over post-sale use of their products.75 Copyright, patent,
trademark, trade secret, and contract law are all tools firms can leverage to threaten
consumers and independent repair providers with potentially ruinous liability and
legal fees. To be clear, these threats are highly contestable. But regardless of their
ultimate merits, they have a chilling effect on repair. Given the uncertainty of
litigation, the expense of mounting a robust defense, and massive resource
disparities, consumers and repair providers are unlikely to withstand a lawsuit.76
One of the key legal tools firms have relied on to restrict repair is § 1201 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).77 That statute makes it unlawful to
circumvent—that is, to remove, bypass, or disable—technological protection
measures (TPMs) that restrict access to copyrighted works.78 In addition, § 1201’s
antitrafficking provisions prohibit the creation, sale, or distribution of tools that
enable circumvention.79 Device makers routinely use TPMs to limit access to the
software code that controls devices from smartphones to cars. That code is often

71. Kevin Purdy, Nikon Is Killing Its Authorized Repair Program, IFIXIT (Dec. 9, 2019),
https://www.ifixit.com/News/34241/nikon-is-killing-its-authorized-repair-program
[https://perma.cc/4BDX-CS3C].
72. Peter Waldman & Lydia Mulvany, Farmers Fight John Deere over Who Gets to Fix
an $800,000 Tractor, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/features/2020-03-05/farmers-fight-john-deere-over-who-gets-to-fix-an-800-000tractor [https://perma.cc/Q8ZW-FQRS]
73. Koebler, supra note 11.
74. Id.
75. For a thorough discussion of the intellectual property issues in the repair context, see
Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Intellectual Property Law and the Right to Repair, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 63 (2019).
76. See Jessica Bursztynsky, Apple Now Has $192.8 Billion in Cash on Hand, Down from
Last Quarter, CNBC (Apr. 30, 2020, 4:41 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/apple-q2
-2020-cash-hoard-heres-how-much-apple-has-on-hand.html [https://perma.cc/S6SJ-UF53];
see generally Anne Sraders, Markets Rally for a Second Day, Pushing Apple’s Market Cap
Back Above $1 Trillion, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2020, 4:21 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/03/25
/aapl-apple-stock-market-cap-dow-jones-sp-500-today-news-rally [https://perma.cc/2MVU
-9LWK] (illustrating the enormity of resources at Apple’s disposal because of the company’s
size and power).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
78. Id. § 1201(a).
79. Id. § 1201(b).
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necessary to diagnose and repair devices. These digital locks pose practical hurdles
for repair. But § 1201 compounds those difficulties by introducing potential legal
liability for repairers who remove or bypass such digital locks.80
To some extent, that risk has been mitigated by exemptions from circumvention
liability recommended by the Copyright Office and adopted by the Librarian of
Congress in the triennial DMCA rulemaking.81 In 2015, the Librarian adopted an
exemption permitting the circumvention of measures applied to “[c]omputer
programs that are contained in and control the functioning of a motorized land
vehicle . . . when circumvention is a necessary step undertaken by the authorized
owner of the vehicle to allow the diagnosis, repair or lawful modification of a vehicle
function.”82 In the next rulemaking, that exemption was renewed and expanded to
include “[c]omputer programs that are contained in and control the functioning of a
lawfully acquired smartphone or home appliance or home system, such as a
refrigerator, thermostat, HVAC or electrical system.”83
These exemptions, while an important success for repair advocates, are limited in
important respects. First, they do not include devices like tablets, smart speakers,
cameras, televisions, and game consoles. Second, they are temporary. In 2021, the
Copyright Office will conduct another rulemaking and may revise, narrow, or
eliminate these exemptions altogether.84 Third, exemptions are limited to § 1201’s
anticircumvention provisions. They provide no defense to the prohibition on
trafficking in circumvention tools.85 In other words, while it is lawful to circumvent
in order to repair these devices, it remains unlawful to create or share tools that enable
circumvention. This creates significant practical hurdles for consumer repair and
increases the risks facing independent repair providers who may develop such tools
in-house. Finally, the exemptions do not address various forms of liability beyond
§ 1201.
The license John Deere distributes with its farm equipment illustrates some of
those risks. As discussed above, John Deere uses proprietary software tools to
authenticate and calibrate replacement parts.86 In response, some farmers have turned

80. Violations of § 1201 give rise to actual or statutory damages in a civil case, up to five
years in prison, and a $500,000 fine for a first offense. Id. §§ 1203–1204.
81. See id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
82. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65954, 65963 (Oct. 28, 2015).
83. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 54010, 54030 (Oct. 26, 2018).
84. In 2018, the Office moved away from its prior practice of renewing each exemption
proposal de novo and adopted a process of presumptive renewal in the absence of “meaningful
opposition.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STREAMLINED PETITIONS FOR RENEWED EXEMPTIONS
(2018),
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/1201_streamlined_renewal_transcript.pdf
[https://perma.cc/27KF-QW84]. How long this new streamlined system will remain in effect
is an open question.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
86. See supra text accompanying note 73. Apple relies on a similar strategy to discourage
independent replacement of faulty batteries. Jason Koebler, Apple Is Locking Batteries to
Specific iPhones, a Nightmare for DIY Repair, VICE (Aug. 8, 2019, 9:41 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59nz3k/apple-is-locking-batteries-to-specific-iphones-a
-nightmare-for-diy-repair [https://perma.cc/K4BY-5AVY].
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to Ukrainian websites that sell unauthorized copies of John Deere software as a
means of bypassing these restrictions.87 Despite the § 1201 exemption, those farmers
likely face at least two sources of legal risk. First, paragraph 5(b) of the John Deere
license says farmers promise not to “purchase . . . any circumvention or hacking
device that is designed to circumvent or hack the [licensed software or product].”88
By acquiring John Deere software from an unauthorized source, farmers have
arguably violated this provision. Similarly, paragraph 4 states that farmers “may not
transmit the [licensed software] over any network or via a hacking device.”89 That
language suggests that using an unauthorized tool for diagnostic purposes would
violate the license terms.
Aside from contract liability, farmers have to contend with copyright law.90 The
act of downloading John Deere software without permission is a plausible act of
infringement, despite the legality of any subsequent act of circumvention. Moreover,
Deere would likely argue that once the terms of the license have been violated,
simply using the equipment would constitute copyright infringement since embedded
software is reproduced in the device’s memory.91
But copyright isn’t the only source of concern. Patent law, although generally
accommodating of repair, gives manufacturers additional avenues for curtailing
repair. Patent exhaustion dictates that after an authorized sale of a patented article,
the patent holder cannot control the use or disposition of that particular article.92 As
a result, owners of patented devices are free to repair them.93 But exhaustion does
not apply to making or reproducing a patented device.94 Courts have therefore
attempted to draw a line between repair and reconstruction. The former is lawful; the
latter requires a license. But the line dividing those categories is sometimes
ambiguous.95 That uncertainty can cast the shadow of potential liability over
consumers and repair providers.
One strategy for frustrating repair is to obtain utility or design patents on
components and replacement parts. Since device makers enjoy the exclusive right to
make patented parts, they can starve repair providers of the replacement parts
essential to their services. If repair providers try to manufacture parts themselves,
they run the risk of patent infringement. For example, when Italian volunteers 3D

87. Koebler, supra note 11.
88. License Agreement for John Deere Embedded Software, JOHN DEERE,
https://www.deere.com/privacy_and_data/docs/agreement_pdfs/english/2016-10-28
-Embedded-Software-EULA.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8NX-HAJC].
89. Id.
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
91. While plausible, this claim is dubious for at least two reasons. First, the RAM copy
doctrine on which it is premised rests on dubious legal footing. See Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing
RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067 (2010). Second, courts are reluctant to impose
copyright liability for license violations that do not bear some reasonable connection to the
underlying copyright interests. See MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't., Inc., 629 F.3d 928,
941 (9th Cir. 2010).
92. See, e.g., Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1526 (2017).
93. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342–46 (1961).
94. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 283–84 (2013).
95. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the
Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 425 (1999).
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printed replacement ventilator valves in the midst of the COVID–19 pandemic, they
were exposed to potential patent liability.96
Given that the standards the Patent Office and Federal Circuit apply to design
patents, they provide an even more problematic opportunity to curtail the supply of
replacement parts.97 A recent case decided by the Federal Circuit illustrates the
worry. The Automotive Body Parts Association (ABPA) sued Ford, seeking a
declaratory judgment invalidating two Ford design patents on a truck hood and head
lamp.98 ABPA argued that since consumers prefer parts that not only serve the same
function as the original but also “restore the original appearance of their vehicles,”
those designs should be deemed functional rather than merely ornamental.99 The
Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that “the aesthetic appeal of a design to consumers
is inadequate to render that design functional.”100 The court also rejected ABPA’s
exhaustion and repair arguments. Although the sale of a vehicle exhausts Ford’s
control over the physical components that make up that vehicle, that sale does not
entitle the owner to use unauthorized parts that embody a patented design.101 And
since Ford’s design patents addressed specific components of the vehicle rather than
the vehicle in its entirety, patent law’s right of repair did not embrace the use of
unauthorized copies of those components.102 The willingness of the Patent Office and
the Federal Circuit to accept design patents directed to parts of products—and
indeed, fragments of parts of products—increases the risk that such claims will
interfere with otherwise lawful repair.103
Trademarks pose a similar threat, but one tempered by comparatively rigorous
standards for protection. The law permits trademark protection for nonfunctional
elements of product design to the extent that those elements demonstrate acquired
distinctiveness—in other words, if consumers have come over time to associate those
features with a single source of goods. As Grinvald and Tur-Sinai note, a Ford grille
and a Volvo taillight have obtained product design trade dress protection.104 A car
may function with an aftermarket grille or taillight, but in in the absence of available
authentic parts, the aesthetic sacrifice would steer many customers to authorized
repair providers, like local dealers.

96. See Koebler, supra note 13.
97. See JOSHUA D. SARNOFF, WHITE PAPER ON PROTECTING THE CONSUMER PATENT LAW
RIGHT OF REPAIR AND THE AFTERMARKET FOR EXTERIOR MOTOR VEHICLE REPAIR PARTS: THE
PARTS ACT, S. 812; H.R. 1879, 115TH CONGRESS 4 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3082289 [https://perma.cc/B2TS-TYNZ]; see also Sarah Burstein, Is
Design Patent Examination Too Lax?, 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 607, 608 (2018); Sarah Burstein,
The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161, 207–08 (2015) (noting that the patented design
should be conceptualized as the design as applied to a particular type of product, while defining
product as “something sold by an enterprise to its customers”).
98. Auto. Body Parts Ass'n v. Ford Glob. Techs., L.L.C., 930 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1298 (2020) (mem.).
99. Id. at 1319.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1322–23.
102. Id. at 1325.
103. See SARNOFF, supra note 97, at 4–5; The Patented Design, supra note 97, at 229.
104. Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 75, at 116–17.
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Firms also deploy trademark law by seizing imported parts. Since repair providers
often cannot acquire parts directly from device makers, they are forced to rely on the
gray market. These parts are sourced in a variety of ways, but generally take
advantage of the complex global supply chains that firms like Apple rely on. When
Apple contracts with manufacturers to build screens, batteries, or other components,
some of those parts end up in the hands of third-party repair providers. Some are lost
or stolen from production lines and resold. Others fail diagnostic tests, only to be
refurbished and resold. Others are copies of original parts produced by third
parties.105 And still others intermingle third-party and original components.106
In order to invoke trademark law to clamp down on the gray market, Apple
includes its logo on internal parts like batteries, processors, and cables. Most
consumers never set eyes on these internal components and almost certainly don’t
take notice of the logos, some no bigger than a grain of rice.107 But even if they did,
the resale of authentic goods bearing trademarks is generally lawful, whether those
goods are new or refurbished.108 So long as refurbished goods are not presented to
consumers as new, the first sale doctrine permits their resale.109 Nonetheless,
companies like Apple rely on the ambiguous origins of some gray market goods to
seize lawful parts imported by repair providers. And because U.S. law allows for
border seizures of allegedly infringing goods, Apple can rely on nonjudicial
processes that entail little due process or substantive oversight. The company has
relied on the Department of Homeland Security to seize imports of replacement parts.
For example, replacement iPhone screens featuring an authentic Apple flex cable
bearing the company’s logo were seized when Jessa Jones, a prominent repair
professional, tried to import them.110 Similarly, DHS seized authentic Apple batteries
shipped to Louis Rossman, an outspoken independent repair provider.111 Apple has

105. Jason Koebler, Apple Sued an Independent iPhone Repair Shop Owner and Lost, VICE
(Apr. 13, 2018, 12:03 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3yadk/apple-sued-an
-independent-iphone-repair-shop-owner-and-lost [https://perma.cc/LUY7-FYGE].
106. Jason Koebler, DHS Seizes Aftermarket iPhone Screens from Prominent Right-toRepair Advocate, VICE (May 11, 2018, 4:26 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/evk4wk
/dhs-seizes-iphone-screens-jessa-jones [https://perma.cc/SU8T-78TJ].
107. Id.; see also iPhone XS and XS Max Teardown, IFIXIT (Sept. 21, 2018),
https://www.ifixit.com/Teardown/iPhone+XS+and+XS+Max+Teardown/113021
[https://perma.cc/AY67-QM6E].
108. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1947); Nitro Leisure
Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Under U.S.
trademark law, imported goods that are materially different from those sold under the same
mark in the United States can be deemed infringing. See Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v.
Casa Helvetia, Inc. 982 F.2d 633, 641 (1st Cir. 1992).
109. Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C., 341 F.3d at 1362.The use of genuine Apple parts bearing
the company’s mark can be distinguished from cases in which a trademark is added to a thirdparty replacement part. See, e.g., Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Agarwal, No. CV 12-06400,
2012 WL 12886444, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012).
110. Koebler, supra note 106.
111. Matthew Gault & Jason Koebler, DHS Seized Aftermarket Apple Laptop Batteries
from Independent Repair Expert Louis Rossman, VICE (Oct. 19, 2018, 2:25 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3ppvj/dhs-seized-aftermarket-apple-laptop-batteries
-from-independent-repair-expert-louis-rossman [https://perma.cc/WAG8-UK6C].
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relied on similar strategies throughout the world with varying degrees of success.112
Finally, trade secrets offer firms yet another legal mechanism to frustrate repair.
As discussed above, device makers are keen to keep all sorts of information out of
the hands of consumers and repair providers. Service manuals, diagnostics,
schematics, and know-how related to repair techniques are among the kinds of
information firms insist are valuable secrets. From televisions113 to ventilators,114
device makers have asserted trade secrets to increase the cost and inconvenience of
independent repair. And in the legislative debates surrounding repair, firms often
make vague, broad, and largely unsubstantiated assertions about the potential risks
to unspecified secrets that they argue would be subject to mandatory disclosure. In
judging the merits of such claims, the degree to which the information contained in
these documents is already widely known, published, readily ascertainable, or has
been uncovered through reverse engineering is crucial.115 If so, these assertions are
not designed to protect valuable secrets, but—like the rest of the strategies outlined
above—to impede lawful repair.
II. LEGISLATING REPAIR
In response to these varied and persistent efforts to hamper repair, a number of
legislative changes have been proposed. At the federal level, the Promoting
Automotive Repair, Trade, and Sales (PARTS) Act was introduced in 2017.116 The
bill would have created a new defense to design patent infringement claims
exempting the making, selling, or importing of exterior components of motor
vehicles for repair purposes.117 But the PARTS Act stalled in committee. An earlier
effort to eliminate restrictions on repair, the Motor Vehicle Owners Right to Repair
Act, was first proposed in 2001.118 The most recent version, introduced in 2011,
would have required carmakers to provide owners and service providers information,
tools, and equipment necessary “to diagnose, service, maintain, or repair the motor
vehicle.”119 Despite these repeated efforts, federal right to repair legislation failed to
gain traction.
But in 2012, Massachusetts enacted an automotive repair bill that significantly
shaped the national conversation. It required manufacturers of motor vehicles to
“make available for purchase by owners . . . and by independent repair facilities the
same diagnostic and repair information” as well as “all diagnostic repair tools” made

112. Koebler, supra note 105.
113. Toshiba insists its repair manuals are available only to authorized parties under strict
confidentiality agreements. See Letter from John Ryan to Tim Hicks, WIRED (July 31, 2012),
https://www.wired.com/wp-content/uploads/blogs/opinion/wp-content/uploads/2012/11
/toshiba_timhicks_takedownletter.jpeg [https://perma.cc/TV8R-LBY4].
114. Koebler, supra note 13.
115. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1985);
see also DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 251 (Ct. App. 2004).
116. S. 812, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 1879, 115th Cong. (2017).
117. S. 812; H.R. 1879.
118. H.R. 2735, 107th Cong. (2001).
119. H.R. 1449, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
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available to dealers, on “fair and reasonable terms.”120 And car makers must also
“provide access to their onboard diagnostic and repair information system . . . using
an off-the-shelf personal computer” beginning with 2018 model year vehicles.121
Although the bill passed in July, a ballot initiative enacting similar right to repair
obligations was already slated for the November 2012 election. Massachusetts voters
overwhelmingly supported the initiative, with 86% voting in favor.122
The Massachusetts law soon had national implications. In January of 2014,
industry associations representing automakers and repair providers entered into a
nationwide agreement to operate under the terms of the Massachusetts legislation.123
This voluntary arrangement, however, does not operate with the force of law. It does
not bind nonparties, and alleged violations are evaluated by a dispute resolution panel
composed of members of the various trade associations and a mediator.124 Nor would
this détente necessarily embrace efforts to expand the rights of vehicle owners and
repair providers. Another ballot initiative slated for the 2020 Massachusetts election,
for example, would expand manufacturers’ obligations to include telematics data—
information about vehicle performance collected and wirelessly transmitted to
manufacturers.125 Under the proposal, manufacturers would have to make this realtime data available to vehicle owners and independent repair shops.126
Beyond its implications for vehicle repair, the Massachusetts automotive repair
law has served as the template for a broader, nationwide effort to enshrine
consumers’ right to repair in state law. Building off the success of that effort, a
coalition of policy advocates, repair professionals, tinkerers, and everyday
consumers has pushed for legislation that would recognize the right to repair
consumer electronics—not only smartphones, laptops, and televisions, but also
household appliances, wearable technology, farm equipment, and medical devices,
to offer just a few examples. In 2014, the South Dakota legislature considered the
first of these bills.127 Just five years later, right to repair bills were introduced in

120. H. 4362, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2012).
121. Id.
122. 2012 - Statewide - Question 1, MASS. ELECTION STATISTICS, https://electionstats.state
.ma.us/ballot_questions/view/6811 [https://perma.cc/RC6H-HQ5W]. To reconcile disparities
between the ballot initiative and the House bill, another bill was passed in 2013. H.3757, 188th
Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013).
123. See Memorandum of Understanding Among Kathleen Schmatz, President & CEO,
Auto. Aftermarket Indus. Ass’n, Ray Pohlman, President, Coal. for Auto Repair Equal., Mitch
Bainwol, President & CEO, All. Auto. Mfrs., and Michael Stanton, President & CEO, Ass’n
Glob. Automakers (Jan. 15, 2014) https://www.nastf.org/files/public/OtherReference/MOU
_SIGNED_1_15_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q6K-S63A]. In exchange for their promise to
abide by the substantive terms of the law, carmakers extracted a promise from repair providers
to withdraw support and funding for similar bills in other states. Id. Notably, Tesla is not a
signatory to the MOU.
124. Id. See also Adrian Ma, Your Car Talks to the Manufacturer. Advocates Want It to Talk
to You, Too, WBUR (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2019/08/06/right-to
-repair-ballot-measure [https://perma.cc/RG9S-QFB5].
125. See Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 10, at 28–29.
126. Id.
127. S.B. 136, 2014 Legis. Assemb., 89th Sess. (S.D. 2014).
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twenty statehouses across the country.128
These bills closely track a model proposal from the Repair Association, an
umbrella organization representing repair providers, advocates, hobbyists, and
environmental activists.129 Its key provision would require manufacturers of digital
electronics to “make available, for purposes of diagnosis, maintenance, or repair, to
any independent repair provider, or to the owner of digital electronic equipment . . .
on fair and reasonable terms, documentation, parts, and tools, inclusive of any
updates to information or embedded software.”130 And for equipment protected by
electronic security measures, manufacturers must “make available . . . any special
documentation, tools, and parts needed to reset the lock or function when disabled in
the course of diagnosis, maintenance, or repair.”131
The right to repair movement has attracted a diverse constellation of supporters,
including the American Farm Bureau,132 the Illinois Health and Hospital
Association,133 the New York Times editorial board,134 Bernie Sanders,135 and
Elizabeth Warren.136 Despite this support and the movement’s considerable success
in persuading state legislators to introduce these bills, none have been enacted yet.
But given the intense anti-repair lobbying the bills have provoked, that failure is
hardly surprising. The companies condemning right to repair proposals—
occasionally publicly, but more often behind closed doors—include Apple, AT&T,
Caterpillar, Dyson, GE Healthcare, John Deere, Lexmark, LG, Medtronic, Microsoft,

128. Those states included: California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. California
Becomes 20th State in 2019 to Consider Right to Repair Bill, U.S. PIRG (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://uspirg.org/news/usp/california-becomes-20th-state-2019-consider-right-repair-bill
[https://perma.cc/J42Q-R5TY]. At least one more state has introduced a bill in 2020. Kevin
Purdy, Right to Repair Is Gaining Ground in 2020, IFIXIT (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.ifixit
.com/News/35606/right-to-repair-is-gaining-ground-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/M4EJ-Z6P4].
129. About Us, REPAIR ASS’N, https://repair.org/association [https://perma.cc/JBU6
-4QVW].
130. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, REPAIR ASS’N, (Jan. 22, 2020), https://repair.org/s
/Right-to-repair-model-state-law-updated-1-22-20.docx [https://perma.cc/39P2-A3D8].
131. Id.
132. Kevin O’Reilly, American Farm Bureau Reaffirms Support for Right to Repair, U.S.
PIRG (Jan. 22, 2020), https://uspirg.org/blogs/blog/usp/american-farm-bureau-reaffirmssupport-right-repair [https://perma.cc/A2VW-HB7Y].
133. Agam Shah, Who Has a Right to Repair Your Farm or Medical Tools?, ASME, (Apr.
16, 2019), https://www.asme.org/topics-resources/content/has-right-repair-farm-medical
-tools [https://perma.cc/XEG7-LK6R].
134. N.Y. Times Ed. Bd., It’s Your iPhone. Why Can’t You Fix It Yourself?, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/opinion/sunday/right-to-repair
-elizabeth-warren-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/RS3H-L88V].
135. Matthew Gault, Bernie Sanders Calls for a National Right-to-Repair Law for
Farmers, VICE (May 5, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8xzqmp/bernie
-sanders-calls-for-a-national-right-to-repair-law-for-farmers [https://perma.cc/6V73-393C].
136. Team Warren, Leveling the Playing Field for America’s Family Farmers, MEDIUM
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/leveling-the-playing-field-for-americas
-family-farmers-823d1994f067 [https://perma.cc/B2YW-ED2U].

378

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:361

Toyota, Verizon, and Wahl.137 This partial list excludes trade associations and
industry groups like the Entertainment Software Association (ESA)138 and
AdvaMed, among others, that lobby against repair bills on behalf of their
members.139
Aside from predictable concerns over intellectual property, these firms and their
trade associations offered an assortment of alarmist arguments to undermine support
for right to repair legislation. Apple told Nebraska lawmakers that the bill would turn
the state into a “Mecca for bad actors,” predicting that hackers and other nefarious
figures would flock to the state to exploit consumers.140 And in California, it warned
that consumers were at risk of physical injury if they attempted to swap out their
iPhone batteries.141 Wahl cautioned that repair of its hair clippers could cause fires,
while Dyson and LG issued unfounded warnings that the right to repair could put
consumers’ personal safety at risk by allowing repair personnel in their homes who
had not cleared background checks.142
More plausibly, medical device manufacturers and their trade groups have raised
health and safety concerns around repair. AdvaMed, a medical device trade group,
warned Massachusetts lawmakers that the state’s proposed repair legislation “could
result in maintenance and repairs of medical devices being performed by untrained
personnel, and that inappropriate replacement parts may be used.”143 Likewise, GE
Healthcare’s letter to New Hampshire legislators claimed that state’s bill would
“require manufacturers of FDA Class I and II medical devices to provide proprietary
diagnostic and repair information to unregulated service providers.”144 The
implication is clear: third parties cannot be trusted to repair medical devices. But
according to a recent Food and Drug Administration (FDA) report, “the continued
availability of third party entities to service and repair medical devices is critical to

137. See Jason Koebler, The Right to Repair Battle Has Come to Silicon Valley, VICE (Mar.
7, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8xdp94/right-to-repair
-california-bill [https://perma.cc/JFE3-2MNR] [hereinafter Right to Repair Battle]; Koebler,
supra note 30; Jason Koebler, Appliance Companies Are Lobbying to Protect Their DRMFueled Repair Monopolies, VICE (Apr. 25, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us
/article/vbxk3b/appliance-companies-are-lobbying-against-right-to-repair [https://perma.cc
/SP5T-ASGR] [hereinafter Appliance Companies]; Koebler, supra note 13; Olivia Solon, A
Right to Repair: Why Nebraska Farmers Are Taking on John Deere and Apple, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 6, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/06/nebraska
-farmers-right-to-repair-john-deere-apple [https://perma.cc/5L8C-8849].
138. Gault, supra note 30.
139. Koebler, supra note 13.
140. Michael Hiltzik, Column: How Apple and Other Manufacturers Attack Your Right to
Repair Their Products, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com
/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-right-repair-20181116-story.html [https://perma.cc/7T5K
-DHP6].
141. Jason Koebler, Apple Is Telling Lawmakers People Will Hurt Themselves if They Try
to Fix iPhones, VICE (Apr. 30, 2019, 3:56 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article
/wjvdb4/apple-is-telling-lawmakers-people-will-hurt-themselves-if-they-try-to-fix-iphones
[https://perma.cc/8XUX-RN52].
142. Appliance Companies, supra note 137.
143. Koebler, supra note 13.
144. Id.
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the functioning of the U.S. healthcare system.”145 As the FDA explained, many thirdparty repair providers deliver “high quality, safe, and effective servicing of medical
devices.”146 The importance of third-party repair was illustrated when Los Angeles
received 170 broken ventilators in the midst of the COVID–19 crisis. Rather than
shipping them back to the manufacturer, California relied on Bloom Energy, a firm
that makes fuel-cell energy generators, which successfully repaired the ventilators in
a matter of days.147
The views of device makers have certainly been heard in the repair debate, as have
those of independent repair providers. And while organizations like U.S. PIRG have
advocated for repair as essential to the public interest, the actual views of everyday
consumers have been largely absent from the ongoing policy debate over the right to
repair. Since most consumers will only occasionally fix a broken device even in the
most repair-friendly of environments, their interests in the outcome of this debate are
considerably more diffuse than either device makers or repair providers. But
collectively, the beliefs, expectations, and practices of consumers are crucial in
evaluating both pending state right to repair proposals and the broader legislative and
regulatory repair agenda. The next Part reveals those views.
III. SURVEYING REPAIR
The case for legislative intervention in repair markets depends on two key
propositions. First, it asserts that legal and practical constraints limit the availability
and increase the cost of repair. As Part I detailed, those restrictions are very real.
Second, it assumes that changes in the law will influence consumer behavior by
lowering effective barriers to repair. But the degree to which lower prices and wider
availability of repair will result in an uptick in consumer or third-party repair hinges
on consumer expectations and preferences surrounding the reparability of the
products they buy. If instead, consumers view their devices as disposable
“throwaways”—as one New Hampshire legislator referred to smartphones—then
repair legislation is unlikely to have much effect.148
In order to assess how consumers understand and relate to repair, I conducted a
web-based survey of internet users (N=838) in 2020.149 The sample was broadly

145. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REPORT ON THE QUALITY, SAFETY, AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF SERVICING OF MEDICAL DEVICES (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media
/113431/download [https://perma.cc/43BV-EMHG].
146. Id.
147. Samantha Masunaga, California Companies Jump in to Supply Ventilators Needed in
Coronavirus Fight, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020, 11:41 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business
/story/2020-03-23/coronavirus-california-companies-medical-supplies [https://perma.cc
/C6H8-HLMP].
148. Timothy Geigner, Totally In-Touch NH Lawmaker Blocks Device Repair Bill, Tells
Constituents to Just Buy New $1k Phones, TECHDIRT (Nov. 1, 2019, 7:39 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20191029/07142043278/totally-in-touch-nh-lawmaker
-blocks-device-repair-bill-tells-constituents-to-just-buy-new-1k-phones.shtml
[https://perma.cc/Y3XF-TSNG].
149. The survey was administered using the internet survey platform Qualtrics. The panel
of respondents was drawn from an initial pool of 7500 internet users who were invited to
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representative of the U.S. population with respect to sex,150 age,151 and income152
according to census data. In addition, the survey collected information on
respondents’ races,153 education levels,154 as well as their tendencies to buy the latest
electronic devices.155
The survey asked a series of five screening questions to limit respondents to those
who were in the market for one of five categories of electronic devices. Specifically,
those questions asked whether the respondent purchased in the prior twelve months
or was considering purchasing in the next twelve months: a smartphone, tablet, smart

participate in the survey. From that initial pool, 2027 participants began the survey, and 838
successfully completed it. 1168 respondents were excluded for failing to meet demographic
criteria or screening questions. Twenty-one incomplete responses were also excluded.
150. The panel was 49% male and 51% female. This matches 2010 census data. See
LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-03, AGE AND SEX
COMPOSITION: 2010 2 (2011) https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf.
151. The age distribution of the survey panel was: eighteen to twenty-four, 14%; twentyfive to thirty-four, 17%; thirty-five to forty-four, 18%; forty-five to fifty-four, 17%; fifty-five
to sixty-four, 13%; sixty-five or older, 21%. This sample is well aligned with 2019 census
estimates. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR
SELECTED AGE GROUPS BY SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES (2019) https://www.census.gov/data
/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-hinc/hinc-01.html [https://perma.cc/2S2F
-MFCE].
152. The distribution of the panel by household income was: less than $24,999, 14%;
$25,000 to under $49,999, 23%; $50,000 to under $74,999, 19%; $75,000 to under $99,999,
13%; $100,000 to under $149,999, 15%; over $150,000, 14%. This closely tracks 2018 census
data. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS BY TOTAL
MONEY INCOME (2019), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income
-poverty/cps-hinc/hinc-01.html [https://perma.cc/JG9M-VZDF]. Annual incomes below
$25,000 are underrepresented in the survey panel. This likely reflects the expense of many of
the devices targeted in the screening questions.
153. The distribution of the panel by race was: White/Caucasian, 77%; African American,
10%; Hispanic, 6%, Asian, 4%; Native American, 2%; Pacific Islander, less than 1%; Other
2%. African Americans are somewhat underrepresented, but the sample is otherwise broadly
representative of the U.S. population. See KAREN R. HUMES, NICHOLAS A. JONES & ROBERTO
R. RAMIREZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-02, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN:
2010 4 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf [https://perma.cc
/H6US-SL4H].
154. The distribution of the panel by education level was: Less than High School, 1%; High
School/GED, 17%; Some College, 26%; 2-year College Degree, 14%; 4-year College Degree,
24%; Master’s Degree, 14%; Doctoral Degree, 1%; Professional Degree (JD, MD), 2%. The
survey sample was more highly educated than the overall U.S. population, with those with a
high school education or less considerably underrepresented. See Educational Attainment in
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Feb.
21,
2019),
the
United
States:
2018,
U.S.
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/demo/education-attainment/cps-detailed-tables
.html [https://perma.cc/FD4C-YSMT].
155. Respondents were asked, “How would you describe your use of new technologies?”
Their responses were as follows: I am usually the first person in my social circle to buy the
latest devices, 30%; I tend to wait a while before buying the latest devices, 50%; I don't have
strong preferences about buying the latest devices, 14%; I tend to avoid buying the latest
devices, 2%; I almost never buy the latest devices, 3%.
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speaker, digital camera, or smart refrigerator.156 The order of these questions was
randomized. If a respondent answered “Yes” to one of the questions, they were then
asked a series of follow-up questions about that device.157 Aside from the device at
issue, those five sets of questions were identical. After completing the devicespecific questions, each respondent was asked about their experience repairing or
attempting to repair a smartphone or tablet. Finally, the survey asked respondents
about their familiarity with the “right to repair” and the degree to which they support
legislation designed to secure it.
A. Expectations of Repair
The first set of device-specific questions was designed to measure the degree to
which consumers expect and value the ability to repair the products they buy. The
responses reveal high expectations of reparability across device categories. They
further reveal the extent to which consumers are surprised, angered, and even
betrayed to learn that device makers may limit their choices around the repair of
products they have purchased.
Respondents were asked: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
“If I purchase a [device], I have the right to repair it myself or to take it to the repair
shop of my choice.” As Figure 1 illustrates, the vast majority of respondents agreed
with this sentiment, and 60% strongly agreed. The results for smartphones and tablets
were nearly indistinguishable with the overall responses. Notably, digital camera
purchasers expressed significantly stronger expectations for repair. 75% strongly
agreed, and another 18% somewhat agreed. Digital cameras, which first appeared in
the 1990s, predate many of the recent efforts to restrict repair, perhaps explaining
consumers’ stronger expectations. In contrast, two relatively recent product
categories—smart speakers and refrigerators—elicited less overwhelming responses.
But even in those cases, sizable majorities expected freedom to repair their devices
as they saw fit.

156. These devices were chosen for several reasons. First, they reflect a range of prices
from less than a hundred to thousands of dollars. Second, some are nearly ubiquitous, while
others are relatively uncommon. Third, they are all devices consumers experience difficulty
repairing to some degree.
157. The survey was designed to keep these groups roughly equal in size: 169 for
smartphones; 169 for digital camera; 168 for smart speakers; 168 for tablets; and 164 for smart
refrigerators. Respondents who answered “No” to all five questions were disqualified.
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Figure 1: Right to Repair

As an alternative measure, respondents were asked: If you learned that the
manufacturer of your [device] limited your ability to repair it yourself or have it
repaired, how would you feel? Not surprisingly, majorities of respondents indicated
that they would be either “very surprised” or “somewhat surprised.” However, as
seen in Figure 2, the levels of surprise were markedly lower than the measure of
expectation reported above. In part, this may indicate that consumers regard device
makers with some degree of skepticism. After revelations of secret microphones,158
throttled processors,159 and defeat devices,160 there is very little that would surprise
some consumers.

158. Sidney Fussell, The Microphones That May Be Hidden in Your Home, ATLANTIC (Feb.
23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/googles-home-securitydevices-had-hidden-microphones/583387 [https://perma.cc/G5NE-6CLE].
159. See Robertson, supra note 49.
160. Bill Chappell, 11 Million Cars Worldwide Have Emissions 'Defeat Device,’
Volkswagen Says, NPR (Sept. 22, 2015, 6:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way
/2015/09/22/442457697/11-million-cars-worldwide-have-emissions-problem-volkswagen
-says [https://perma.cc/R8G5-XPLR].
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Figure 2: Manufacturer Limitations

Respondents were also given an opportunity to describe in their own words how
they would feel if they learned of restrictions on the repair of their device. They were
asked: How else would you feel if you learned that the manufacturer of your [device]
limited your ability to repair it or have it repaired? Consistent with results described
above, these open-ended responses were quite critical of such restrictions 67% were
negative (557), and only 9% were positive (79). The remaining 24% were neutral,
unclear, or non-responsive (202).161
The negative sentiments included a number of respondents who felt: “angry” (63),
“upset” (60), “disappointed” (37), “frustrated” (28), “annoyed” (26), “mad” (22),
“cheated” (17), and “pissed” (9). Those were in addition to respondents who
described feeling “conned,” “deceived,” “scamm[ed],” and “swindled.” Other
responses focused on the ways in which repair restrictions interfere with consumer
autonomy. One respondent noted, “I don’t think [manufacturers] have any right to
tell me what I can do with it after I purchase it.” Another was concerned that “the
manufacturer is impacting my freedom to do with what I want a product that I legally
own.”
Among respondents who expressed positive reactions to repair restrictions, two
themes emerged. First, several respondents believed that manufacturers have greater
expertise and can ensure high-quality repairs. One noted that “specialized equipment
inside . . . requires the manufacture’s [sic] touch.” As another put it, “the
manufacturer knows more than I would or my local Joe to fix it.” Second, several
respondents expressed favorable views of limitations on repair to the extent
necessary to keep the product under warranty, a worry the FTC has attempted to
assuage by reminding firms that it is illegal to condition warranty coverage on the

161. All references to questions and responses in this Part refer to the survey conducted by
the author from March 4–12, 2020.
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use of particular parts or service providers.162
B. Materiality of Repair
The next pair of questions was intended to measure the degree to which repair
restrictions, if disclosed, are material to consumer decision-making. The first asked:
If you knew the manufacturer limited your ability to repair a [device], would that
affect your willingness to purchase that [device]? Overall, more than 70% of
respondents indicated that restrictions on repair would make them either much less
likely (40%) or somewhat less likely (32%) to purchase one of the five devices. These
results were largely consistent across device types, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Materiality of Repair

Materiality, however, is not simply a binary question of whether a consumer
would make a purchase. It is also reflected in the price consumers are willing to pay
for a product. So, respondents were also asked: If you knew the manufacturer limited
your ability to repair a [device], would that affect the price you would be willing to
pay for that [device]? Rather than ask for absolute numbers, given the considerable
variation in price within and among these product categories, respondents were
presented with comparative measures of their willingness to pay. And again, the vast

162. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act prohibits manufacturers that charge more than $5
for a product from restricting repair of the devices covered by warranties. 15 U.S.C. § 2301.
But a recent study found that forty-five out of fifty appliance makers claimed to void
warranties for unauthorized repairs. Nathan Proctor, Survey Finds 45 of 50 Companies Void
Warranties for Independent Repair, U.S. PIRG (Oct. 11, 2018), https://uspirg.org/news/usp
/survey-finds-45-50-companies-void-warranties-independent-repair [https://perma.cc/52VG
-ZWTX].
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majority indicated that they would pay less for a device burdened by repair
restrictions, with 40% willing to pay “much less” and 30% willing to pay “somewhat
less.” As Figure 4 shows, those percentages were slightly lower for refrigerators,
products that respondents perhaps assume are less likely to require repair.
Figure 4: Price Change

By both of these metrics, consumers not only have expectations of repair, but
accurate information about repair restrictions will inform and shape their
marketplace behavior.
C. Experience with Repair
The next set of questions focused on respondents’ experience with repair. In order
to maximize the sample, these questions focused exclusively on smartphones and
tablets. Nearly all respondents (825) indicated that they owned a smartphone or
tablet. Of those, 86% said they had “replaced, discarded, or recycled a smartphone
or tablet” for one or more of the reasons below. Cracked screens and dead batteries—
two easily repairable problems—were by far the most prevalent reasons identified
by respondents for discarding or replacing their devices. As Figure 5 illustrates, most
devices are discarded because of the failure of physical components.
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Figure 5: Replacing, Discarding, or Recycling

Interest in repair was high among respondents. Among respondents who had
replaced, discarded, or recycled a smartphone or tablet, 92% had considered or
attempted repairing it themselves or having it repaired. Half of respondents
considered or attempted independent repair services. Slightly fewer, 48%, considered
or attempted manufacturer repair. And 44% considered or attempted self-repair.
When asked to describe their experience, 52% said repairs were too expensive, and
24% reported that the necessary parts and tools were unavailable.
These responses suggest that consumers are open to and interested in repairing
their devices. But cost and the availability of parts and tools are significant
roadblocks. Right to repair laws would address both of these concerns. By mandating
the availability of parts and tools, those laws would reduce the costs consumers and
repair providers face in securing components. At the same time, by lowering barriers
to entry, they would encourage a more competitive repair market, further driving
down prices for repair services.
Respondents were also asked about their experience with trade-in programs. More
than half, 54%, reported that they had “received or been offered credit on a new
device in exchange for trading in a damaged or broken smartphone or tablet.” As
Figure 6 illustrates, 78% of those respondents said they were “much more” or
“somewhat more willing” to buy a new device in light of the trade-in offer. And 38%
reported that the trade-in offer reduced their interest in repairing their device.
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Figure 6: Consumer Considerations

D. Support for Repair
Finally, respondents were asked about their awareness of and support for the right
to repair. Although the majority of respondents were not familiar with the right to
repair, they overwhelmingly supported legislative interventions like those under
consideration in statehouses around the country.
When asked: How familiar are you with the idea of the ‘right to repair’ electronic
devices, appliances, and other consumer goods?, 52% of respondents said they were
“not at all familiar,” and only 12% indicated they were “very familiar.” Despite the
low level of awareness of the right to repair as a concept or movement, support for
legislation designed to help secure that right was overwhelmingly popular. As seen
in Figure 7, 86% of respondents—the same percentage of Massachusetts voters who
favored that state’s automotive repair law in 2012—expressed support for “legal
rules that require device makers to provide parts, tools, software updates, and
documentation available to independent repair shops and consumers on reasonable
terms.” And nearly 60% strongly supported them. For respondents who indicated
they were “very familiar” with the right to repair, support was even higher, with 98%
favoring the legislation.163

163. These results are consistent with a 2019 study of support for the right to repair among
Canadians. See Innovative Research Grp., Right to Repair: National Online Omnibus Survey,
OPEN MEDIA (May 2019), https://openmedia.org/sites/openmedia.org/files/openmedia_right
_to_repair_omnibus_questions_report_-_20190531.pdf [https://perma.cc/349E-BGB4]. More
than 60% of U.S. survey respondents indicated they would favor the next President signing an
executive order mandating the right to repair. David Dayen, The Day One Agenda Polls Pretty
Well, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 11, 2020), https://prospect.org/day-one-agenda
/executive-authority-polls-pretty-well [https://perma.cc/6XLE-GXHC].
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Figure 7: Support for Right to Repair

IV. IMPLICATIONS
The survey results outlined above establish that right to repair legislation enjoys
broad popular support that is likely to grow as consumers become more familiar with
the issue. Beyond popular approval, the survey data also affirm the theory underlying
legislative intervention in repair markets. The high costs of repairs and the limited
availability of parts and tools are significant barriers. Mandating access for
consumers and third-party repair providers would reduce prices, foster competition,
and increase the prevalence of repair.
If made law, these bills would save consumers untold millions of dollars and spare
the environment from some of the harms of rampant digital consumerism.164 But
these bills are not a cure-all. They are limited in scope and cannot be expected to
address every impediment to repair. Overbroad interpretations of intellectual
property rights will continue to plague repair providers. And design techniques
hostile to repair will remain a source of ongoing frustration.
One important shortcoming of the pending bills is the absence of any affirmative
obligation on the part of device makers to produce replacement parts. The model bill
provides, “[n]othing in this section requires an original equipment manufacturer to
make available a part if the part is no longer available to the original equipment
manufacturer.”165 So, if a firm decides to phase out support for a product after only
a couple of years, it is not required to make parts available to the third-party repair
market. A more stringent approach would insist that firms supply parts for a specified
period of time. California law, for example, already mandates seven years of support
for products that cost $100 or more, including supplying replacement parts.166
European regulators are taking an even more aggressive stance. In addition to an
obligation to supply parts for up to ten years, new ecodesign rules require that

164. To take just one metric of those harms, the United Nations reported that in 2019 alone,
global electronic waste totaled 53.6 million tons. VANESSA FORTI, CORNELIS P. BALDÉ,
RUEDIGER KUEHR & GARAM BEL, THE GLOBAL E-WASTE MONITOR 2020: QUANTITIES, FLOWS,
AND THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY POTENTIAL 13 (2020).
165. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 130.
166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.03(b) (requiring manufacturers of electronics and appliances
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products be designed so that replacement parts can be installed using commonly
available tools and without damaging the device.167 The first round of regulations
applies to household appliances like refrigerators, washing machines, and
dishwashers.168 But the European Commission has announced plans for another set
of ecodesign rules to increase the reparability of phones, tablets, and laptops.169 Such
rules might even require companies to design phones and laptops with easily
replaceable batteries.170
Rather than promote repair by merely increasing the accessibility of parts and
encouraging competition, the European approach proactively shapes product design
by insisting on devices built to facilitate repair. Given the size of the European
market, manufacturers may apply these new standards globally. In much the same
way, the Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) Directive shaped the design
of electronics by regulating the use of heavy metals.171
Device makers would undoubtedly resist any regulatory intervention in the design
process. They would note, accurately, that product design is a complex exercise that
requires balancing and prioritizing a range of competing, interdependent
considerations. Technical constraints limit functionality; competitive constraints
limit price; design philosophies and conventions inform aesthetic choices; consumer
tastes and trends affect a range of product attributes; and legal rules, from patents to
products liability, layer additional constraints across all these dimensions. No doubt,
legal obligations like those contemplated by the Ecodesign Directive introduce
additional complexity into the design process. But durability and reparability are
hardly unknown considerations for designers. These rules simply require them to
prioritize those familiar considerations in order to meet clear objectives.
Nor would an approach that intercedes in the design of consumer products to
protect the interests of consumers and the environment be unheard of in the United
States. Federal law, for example, has mandated seat belts in motor vehicles since

with wholesale prices of $100 or more with express warranties to “make available to service
and repair facilities sufficient service literature and functional parts”). Such a requirement
undoubtedly increases costs for device makers, some of which may be passed onto consumers
indirectly. To the extent such price increases internalize the costs of device production and
disposal, they should be celebrated. The costs of legacy support may also slow the introduction
of new products, but a reduction in the frequency of minor, incremental improvements meant
to drive product upgrade cycles may be a reasonable tradeoff for achieving a corresponding
reduction in the environmental harm of digital consumerism.
167. The New Ecodesign Measures Explained, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_19_5889 [https://perma.cc
/8XHQ-EGV5].
168. Id.
169. Questions and Answers: A New Circular Economy Action Plan for a Cleaner and
More Competitive Europe, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Mar. 11, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu
/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_419 [https://perma.cc/K89P-D5WB].
170. Charlie Wood & Sophia Ankel, Europe May Force Makers of Smartphones, Tablets
and Wireless Earphones to Install Easily Replaceable Batteries, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 27, 2020,
12:09 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/europe-smartphone-tablet-wireless-earphone
-makers-replaceable-batteries-proposal-2020-2 [https://perma.cc/8J96-79LN].
171. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2012).
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1968.172 And beginning in 1975, federal standards have regulated vehicle fuel
efficiency.173 Given the hundreds of billions of dollars U.S. consumers spend on
electronics each year and the staggering environmental costs of disposable
consumerism, such intervention may well be justified.174 Rather than regulatory
oversight of the design process, the U.S. approach tends to focus on targeting
consumer harm after the fact. But even from that perspective, regulators could be
more proactive.
In 2019, the Federal Trade Commission held a workshop on third-party repair,
recognizing that the issue falls within the FTC’s broad jurisdiction.175 There are three
distinct theories under which the FTC could pursue repair restrictions imposed by
device makers: monopolization of the repair market, deceptive practices, and unfair
practices. Each of these approaches deserves careful exploration, but my goal here is
to briefly outline them.
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc., limiting access to replacement parts may violate antitrust law.176
Kodak manufactured and sold photocopiers. After the company refused to sell
replacement parts for those devices to owners and independent repair providers, the
Court held that competition in the photocopier market did not absolve Kodak’s
monopolization of the post-sale parts and service markets. Subsequently, the Ninth
Circuit rejected Kodak’s assertion that exercise of its copyright and patent rights
justified its anticompetitive conduct.177
Device makers who attempt to prevent repair could face antitrust liability under
at least three theories.178 First, firms with market power that refuse to provide parts,
tools, and information may violate the Sherman Act.179 Such claims are particularly

172. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–12.
173. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871.
174. Consumer Tech U.S. Sales to Reach Record $422 Billion in 2020; Streaming Services
PRESS
(Jan.
6,
2020),
Spending
Soars,
Says
CTA,
ASSOCIATED
https://apnews.com/Business%20Wire/712622c00b204d8c96316abeca61d41e
[https://perma.cc/6ZVQ-URCG].
175. See Nixing the Fix: A Workshop on Repair Restrictions, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July
16, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/nixing-fix-workshoprepair-restrictions [https://perma.cc/R358-LZ5C].
176. 504 U.S. 451, 451 (1992).
177. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1212 (9th Cir. 1997)
(affirming Sherman Act violations against manufacturer that refused to sell parts to
independent service providers). But see Schor v. Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir.
2006) (describing the Image Technical decision as adopting “an undisciplined monopolyleveraging principle”); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (declining to follow Image Technical in evaluating a “patentee's subjective
motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented products”).
178. See generally DANIEL A. HANLEY, CLAIRE KELLOWAY & SANDEEP VAHEESAN, FIXING
AMERICA: BREAKING MANUFACTURERS’ AFTERMARKET MONOPOLY AND RESTORING
CONSUMERS’ RIGHT TO REPAIR (2020) (surveying potential liability for repair restrictions
under U.S. antitrust law).
179. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (holding
that ski resort’s unilateral refusal to deal with a competitor could violate the Sherman Act).
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plausible if a device maker terminates an existing relationship that sacrifices shortterm profitability, as when Nikon cut off its authorized repair providers.180
Second, device makers may be liable for unlawfully tying products. Where a
seller’s market power over one product allows it to “force the buyer into the purchase
of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to
purchase elsewhere on different terms,” such tying arrangements are unlawful.181 So,
when firms like John Deere make repair impossible without engaging the company’s
authorized providers, they may be unlawfully tying aftermarket services to
equipment sales.
Finally, courts have recognized that the design of a product can itself be predatory.
For example, among the bases for antitrust liability in its case against Microsoft, the
government cited the company’s exclusion of Internet Explorer from the Windows
Add/Remove Programs utility and its decision to ignore users’ default browser
settings.182 Similar scrutiny has been applied to the design of medical devices,183
pharmaceuticals,184 and processors.185 But courts considering such claims are often
quick to accept justifications for designs that indicate some motivation aside from
restraining competition. More generally, given the long-running trend of anemic
antitrust enforcement, repair providers alleging antitrust violations have not typically
succeeded.186 At least one recent case, however, suggests these theories remain
viable.187
Aside from antitrust violations, the FTC could consider the practice of selling
consumers’ devices subject to restrictive repair policies to be deceptive. A deception
claim requires proof of: (1) “a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer”; (2) the practice is examined from the perspective of a
reasonable consumer; and (3) “the representation, omission, or practice must be
‘material.’”188
Device makers rarely make explicit claims about the reparability of their products.
Nor do they regularly assure consumers that they will be free to repair their devices

180. See Purdy, supra note 71. See also Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2003).
181. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
182. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
183. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (arguing
defendant’s modification of its tissue sampling gun and needles prevented interoperability
with plaintiff’s products and was undertaken for predatory reasons).
184. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 659 (2d Cir. 2015)
(affirming determination that the manufacturer’s introduction of a once-daily Alzheimer's drug
at the end of the patent term for a twice-daily version and subsequent withdrawal of that twicedaily version violated the Sherman Act).
185. Intel Corp., 61 F.T.C 247 (2010) (addressing Intel’s alleged predatory redesigns and
prohibiting it from making changes that degrade the performance of competitors products and
do not provide an ‘actual’ benefit to its own products).
186. See Jonathan I. Gleklen, The ISO Litigation Legacy of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services: Twenty Years and Not Much to Show for It, 27 ANTITRUST 56, 62 (2012).
187. In Red Lion Medical Safety Inc. v. General Electric Company, a jury found that GE
monopolized the market for repair of its anesthesia machines. No. 2:15-CV-308, 2016 WL
3770958 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2016).
188. Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Opinion Letter (Oct. 14,
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using whatever parts or services they choose. In fact, the FTC has admonished some
device makers for doing the opposite—unlawfully asserting that warranties will be
voided for unauthorized repairs.189 Nonetheless, language used in the promotion and
sale of devices may give rise to an actionable deception claim.190 More importantly,
the omission of material information in advertising or other commercial
communications can form the basis of deception.191 If consumers suffer from
misimpressions or false understandings as the result of undisclosed information, they
have been misled even if their misapprehension arises from consumer expectations
rather than the seller’s affirmative acts.192
The survey evidence indicates that consumers have strong expectations regarding
their right to repair the devices they buy. More than 80% of respondents expressed
their belief that they have the right to repair devices themselves or to rely on the
repair shop of their choice. That figure is well above the significant minority—
roughly 10 or 15% of consumers—typically necessary to establish deception.193
Admittedly, this conclusion is complicated by the range of tactics firms use to restrict
repair and the variability of their success. The viability of unauthorized repair
changes over time and between devices. But firms that succeed in limiting the
availability of repair are acting in ways that are inconsistent with demonstrated
consumer expectations.
Not only are repair restrictions misleading, they are material. The materiality
requirement asks whether consumers would behave differently in the market if they
were aware of the truth. In other words, if consumers knew that they would face
hurdles to repairing their devices, would they refuse to purchase them? Would they
purchase them only at a reduced price?194 Materiality can be presumed for claims
relating to a product’s cost and performance—characteristics that arguably relate to

1983).
189. See Proctor, supra note 162. The FTC sent letters to Sony, Microsoft, Nintendo,
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Co., 290 F.3d 578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e believe that survey evidence demonstrating that
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194. See supra Section III.B.
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repair. Otherwise, materiality hinges on direct evidence like surveys or consumer
testimony. Again, the survey reported here strongly supports a finding of materiality.
Across the device categories, roughly 70% of respondents indicated they would be
less likely to buy devices—and willing to pay less for them—if they knew the
manufacturer restricted repair.
Although the failure to disclose repair restrictions may constitute a deceptive
practice, that conclusion will depend on circumstances, policies, and
communications unique to specific device makers. Just as importantly, device
makers may escape liability by providing some additional disclosure rather than
altering the underlying restrictions.
As a result, the FTC’s unfair practices authority may prove more powerful. For a
practice to be unfair, the FTC needs proof of: (1) a substantial injury to consumers;
(2) that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to competition or consumers;
and (3) that is not reasonably avoidable.195 Substantial consumer injuries can include
monetary harm and the purchase of unwanted goods or services. So, policies or
practices that force consumers to pay inflated prices for authorized repair would
typically satisfy this requirement. In many cases, those price premiums may be
hundreds or even thousands of dollars. But smaller harms may qualify when they are
shared by large numbers of individuals.
Once a substantial injury is established, the question becomes whether it is
outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition more broadly. Device makers
would undoubtedly recite a litany of supposed benefits of monopolized repair
markets—greater reliability, safety, and security, increased innovation, and lower
upfront costs, among them. Many of these same arguments have been raised by
lobbyists representing device makers in their conversations with state lawmakers.
Proving them with actual evidence, however, is another matter. As the FDA has
found, independent repair is effective and reliable.196 If that’s true for life-saving
medical technology, it’s almost certainly true for our phones. As to the suggestion
that innovation will decrease and prices will rise, the markups companies like Apple
enjoy suggest that the market may benefit from reductions in both excess incentives
and profits.
The final question is the extent to which consumers can avoid the injuries
associated with repair restrictions. The temporal dimension of this question is
significant. Once a consumer purchases an iPhone or John Deere tractor, for example,
the harms of repair restrictions are unavoidable. And since those restrictions are
typically not disclosed, consumers should not be expected to account for them in
their purchasing decisions. Even before consumers make a purchase, these harms are
often difficult to avoid. Again, because design features and company policies that
frustrate repair are often hidden, it is difficult for consumers to comparison shop on
the basis of reparability. Even if consumers could identify a comparable product
unfettered by repair restrictions, markets for electronic devices are characterized by
lock-in.197 Concerns about interoperability often compel consumers to stay within

195. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, Opinion Letter (Dec.
17, 1980).
196. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 145.
197. See Hoofnagle, Kesari & Perzanowski, supra note 54, at 829.
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one manufacturer’s product ecosystem, reducing the degree to which they can avoid
the harms of exclusive repair policies. And within highly concentrated consumer
products markets, choices are often limited, and repair restrictions may be
commonplace across entire product categories, further bolstering the case for
unfairness.
CONCLUSION
The data presented here demonstrate that consumers expect and value the right to
repair the products they buy. But the practices and policies adopted by device
makers—from product design and pricing to contract terms and assertions of
intellectual property rights—interfere with those expectations. The right to repair
bills pending in states around the country would help ensure the availability of parts,
tools, and information crucial to a functioning independent repair market. But
establishing a robust right to repair will require lawmakers, courts, and regulators to
confront the full range of repair restrictions and to adopt more aggressive,
multifaceted policy interventions to fully protect the interests of consumers.

